INTRODUCTION
The conventional story about the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr 1 to adjudicate disputes over legislative apportionment is that political market failure required judicial intervention The market failed in the case of unequally populated districts because existing legislators could not be expected to vote themselves out of a job, nor would voters who benefit from the existing apportionment plan elect legislators inclined to do so. 3 This market failure makes a strong case for extra-legislative intervention in apportionment, assuming we, or at least courts, may make the normative judgment that unequally populated districts are improper. 4 A subtext of this conventional story is trust in the judiciary. We need faith that judges' impartiality and general wisdom make up for a lack of particular competence in dealing with political matters. Opponents of judicial intervention doubted judicial competence in this area, calling for nonjusticiability because "standards ... for judicial judgment are lacking." ' This concern over "judicial manageability" turned out to be seriously exaggerated in the legislative apportionment and districting cases, where the court's adoption in Reynolds v. Sims of a strict "one person, one vote" standard required little more than knowledge of "sixth grade arithmetic," 6 but it has proven more real in other cases, most recently, as I will explain, in Bush v. Gore. 7 This Article argues that the Baker Court majority and dissenters apparently failed to appreciate the benefits of judicial unmanageability or murky standards for dealing with election cases 1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) . 2. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980) (" [U] nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage.").
3. See id. at 121 (noting that elected representatives have an incentive "toward maintaining whatever apportionment, good or bad, it is that got and keeps them where they are").
4. For a look at this normative question going back to John Locke and to the framers of the United States Constitution, see the sources cited in id. at 122 n.55.
5. Baker, 369 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 6. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also ELY, supra note 2, at 121 (calling administrability the one-person, one-vote standard's "long suit").
7. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) .
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Precisely because these cases require the Supreme Court to make at least implicit normative judgments about the meaning of democracy or the structure of representative government, the danger of manageable standards is that they ossify the new rules and enshrine the current Court majority's political theory. That enshrinement is precisely what happened in the one-person, one-vote cases. Arguably, we cannot be surprised that the Court adopted the manageable standard of equally apportioned districts in Reynolds; arguably manageable standards lower administrative costs, decrease the chances of lower court deviation from Supreme Court pronouncements, and increase reliance interests of those involved in the electoral process. 8 But we must recognize the cost of manageable standards as well.
In contrast to Reynolds, when the Court does not articulate a manageable standard, it leaves room for future Court majorities to deviate from or modify rulings in light of new thinking about the meaning of democracy or the structure of representative government, or based on experience with the existing standard. It also allows for greater experimentation and variation in the lower courts using the new standard. Following modification and experimentation, the Court appropriately may articulate a more manageable standard.
The benefits of an initial unmanageable standard no doubt come with costs as well: greater administrative costs, increased straying by the lower courts from Supreme Court majority pronouncements, and a decreased ability of political actors to rely upon Supreme Court precedent. But lack of Court competence in political matters suggests that those costs are worth bearing, at least for a time, as the Court and lower courts explore the contours of new equal protection rights created in election law cases.
This analysis leads to a two-part prescription for how the Supreme Court should handle equal protection claims in election cases. First, the Court should intervene only when the political process cannot correct itself from apparent political market failure. I 8. In a thoughtful recent paper, Spencer Overton explores this issue in the context of the debate over "rules" versus "standards." Spencer A. Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65 passim (2002). Overton's primary focus, however, is on the use of rules versus standards as a "kind of structural determination about who will make decisions." Id, at 66. He sees the choice about the extent to which the Court should "check the discretion of decisionmakers." Id. My focus here is on what the Court does to bind its own hand in future cases, with the understanding that reinterpreting a vague judicial standard is easier than overruling a non-vague rule.
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suggest this limit because judges are not particularly competent to decide these questions. Thus, courts should engage in the exercise only when the legislative self-interest problem leaves the Court as the only practical alternative to inaction. Second, when the Supreme Court is convinced that intervention is necessary, it must articulate an appropriately precise standard for judging equal protection claims: the more controversial the Court's normative political theory underlying the claim in a particular case, the more it should strive to articulate legal standards that leave wiggle room for future Court majorities to modify. 9
I do not claim that the Court has articulated unmanageable standards in the past for this reason; often such an articulation has been the product of political compromise, sloppy drafting, or unforeseen circumstances. My claim is that the Court should, at least initially, articulate unmanageable standards in certain equal protection election cases in the future.
Much has been written about the first part of this prescription. For example, Professor Pamela S. Karlan recently has argued that the Supreme Court's intervention in the 2000 Florida election controversy was unwarranted because the political process was still working; others, most notably Judge Richard A. Posner, disagree with that assessment of the Florida situation," but presumably not with the premise that judicial intervention is unwarranted when the political market is well-functioning.
Accordingly, this Article focuses on the second part of the prescription: the calibration of the manageability of the judicial standard to the extent of social consensus on the nature of the meaning of political equality. This second part is especially important because there may be significant disagreement on the first partwhether the political market will correct itself. Most scholars writing about Baker v. Carr and cases in its wake have extolled the virtues of 9. At first blush, my argument has similarities to Cass Sunstein's calls for "judicial minimalism," which asserts that the Supreme Court decide as little as possible when it decides controversial cases. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1999). One critical difference between us is that Sunstein calls for such minimalism "[t]o... allow democratically accountable bodies to function .... This is one reason why courts should and do act cautiously when they are in the midst of a 'political thicket.'" Id. at 26. In contrast, I call for initial unmanageability to give the Supreme Court greater information to settle upon the ultimate contours of the particular equal protection rule it will craft. I do not disagree, however, that courts should sometimes act cautiously for the reason Sunstein gives as well.
10. Justice Warren, writing for the Reynolds majority, declared the principle as the "clear and strong command of" 46 the Equal Protection Clause: "This is at the heart of Lincoln's vision of 'government of the people, by the people, (and) for the people.' The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." '47 The Court left the states with just a bit of wiggle room:
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-protection principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature. The one-person, one-vote standard announced by the Court was easy to understand and was popular among the public.
5 2 As Professor Ely points out, once the reapportionment took place on an equal population basis, controversy over the cases died down: legislators elected from the newly apportioned districts had every incentive to preserve the new status quo. 53 The only significant litigation regarding state or congressional apportionment to follow from these cases was the question of how much a state could deviate from exact mathematical equality for subordinate reasons, such as the desire to keep a political subdivision together in one district. The Court has allowed virtually no deviation in the case of congressional districting, 4 and allowed some, but not much, deviation in the case of state legislative districts. 55 Commentators have criticized the emergence of two standards for judging deviation depending upon whether congressional or state legislative districting is involved, pointing out that the text of the Constitution does not give any reason to treat one more leniently than the other. 5 6 Despite these differences, one person, one vote remains the overriding component in districting decisions.
More significant litigation arose out of attempts to apply the oneperson, one-vote standard to local elections. Beginning in Avery v.
Midland County, 7 the Court required local government entities to apply the standard, despite protests that an equally districted state legislature could use state law if desired to equalize any unequally districted local or regional entities 8 The Avery Court left open the possibility that the one-person, one-vote standard would not apply to special purpose districts whose burdens fell disproportionately on one group. 59 In two cases, the Court applied this exception to exempt elections for special purpose water districts.' But these exceptions have not been applied widely. In practice, the lion's share of elections even on the local level are conducted using the one-person, one-vote standard.
Problems with the Judicially Manageable One-Person, One-Vote Standard
Despite the popularity of the one-person, one-vote standard, some scholars recently have attacked it. Not all the attacks are strong; one weak argument claims that the standard has opened up the political system to all kinds of partisan and racial gerrymandering and incumbency protection. 61 According to this argument, once legislators became free to violate traditional "constraints" on redistricting like adherence to the boundaries of political subdivisions in the name of one person, one vote, they were "liberated to snake lines all over the map to achieve their own purposes." ' This claim is weak because no such "constraint" ever existed in the sense of a pre-Reynolds legal obligation on legislators to draw district lines conforming to the boundaries of political subdivisions. Although many pre-Reynolds districts conformed to such subdivisions, conformity resulted from neither legal constraint nor civic motivation. Self-interested legislators looking to protect their interests did not need to violate political boundaries because they had a much more potent weapon to protect themselves: the drawing of vastly unequal districts or simply preserving districts that had become increasingly malapportioned over time. 63 Indeed, adherence to the boundaries provided some political cover for legislators to draw or retain grossly malapportioned districts.
Another, more convincing line of attack has focused on the Avery branch of these cases. Critics have argued that the one-person, one-vote standard sometimes works to prevent the formation of regional governments to deal with problems that appropriately are handled on a regional, rather than local, basis. As Bruce Cain recently explained, the Court's decision to apply the standard: deprived the American people of an entire class of institutional mechanisms for compromise which could be used to solve collective action problems. For example, when the San Francisco Bay area considered establishing a regional government to cope with problems of growth and traffic management, its lawyers informed the planners that they could not design a confederation which did not conform to the principle of one person, one vote. Since the smaller cities were unwilling to join into any arrangement that would allow their suburban votes to be swamped by the more numerous votes of the larger, urban cities, the governance problem proved to be insurmountable. What the Bay Area cities wanted was to replicate the logic of the original compromise that induced smaller states to join the large states in the union at the founding of the country. In effect, the courts made it impossible for modern legislators to do what the Founding Fathers had been able to do. 64 The Bay Area cities were correct in believing the courts would not uphold a regional compromise that violated the one-person, one- 65 and a federal district court rejected a regional plan for the Seattle area that violated the principle. 66 As Richard Briffault explained in his careful examination of this problem, "[t]he inability to create a federal structure in which the principle of population equality is tempered by a concern for some parity among the pre-existing units [of local government] may render the regional unit politically impossible." 67
D. The Road Not Taken: Justice Stewart's Judicially Unmanageable Alternative
The regional government argument advanced by Professors Cain and Briffault suggests a number of responses. First, one could argue that the one-person, one-vote standard's effect of hampering regional government is unfortunate, but it is a small price to pay for the fundamental gains in equality that the Court worked in Wesberry and Reynolds. Second, one could echo Justice Fortas' dissent in Avery, agreeing that the one-person, one-vote standard was necessary on the state level but disagreeing with its application on the local level. Reversal of Avery but not Reynolds would eliminate the de facto Court prohibition on regional governments, and an equally districted state legislature could block unequal and unfair regional government plans.
Both of these responses to the regional government problem are reasonable ones, and choosing between the two today is difficult. But perhaps the problem could have been avoided from the beginning. Despite Justice Brennan's reassuring rhetoric in Baker that equal protection standards were "well developed and familiar," ' 72 He disagreed that unequal districting "debased" a citizen's votes: "I find it impossible to understand how or why a voter in California, for instance, either feels or is less a citizen than a voter in Nevada, simply because, despite their population disparities, each of these states is represented by two United States Senators." 73 Stewart rejected reliance on population equality alone in view of what he saw as the legitimate differing needs of different states. He then put forward his alternative:
The fact is, of course, that population factors must often to some degree be subordinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan which is to achieve the important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced representation of the regional, social, and economic interests within a State.... What constitutes a rational plan reasonably designed to achieve this objective will vary from State Justice Stewart's proposed alternative is an homage to judicial unmanageability 8 Among the terms he did not define carefully in his alternative are: "subordination," "fair, effective and balanced representation," "rational," "reasonably designed," "reasonable achieve [ment] ," "effective and balanced representation," "substantial interests," "effective majority rule," and "systemic frustration of the will of the majority. 0 Critics feared that Justice Stewart's test, which would have required the courts to delve into the details of political power in each state, would have unduly burdened the courts and undermined their legitimacy. For example, Professor Deutsch argued that the test would indeed require the Court to canvass the actual workings of the floor leadership in the legislative branches, the mechanisms of party control not only over voters and the city government but also over elected representativesin short, the details of the petty corruption and networks of personal influence that all too often constitute crucial sources of power in municipal politics .... Even assuming that the evidence was available and would be forthcoming, is it likely that our society could accept, as a steady diet, the spectacle of the judiciary solemnly ruling on the accuracy of a political boss's testimony concerning the sources of his power over voters and the degree of control that he exercised over elected Deutsch's argument raised a genuine concern, though one that appears in hindsight to be unwarranted in light of current litigation under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires the courts to engage in exactly this kind of analysis. 82 The concern could have been tested in the lower courts as they struggled with the new unmanageable standard. This period of experimentation would have benefited not only the development of standards for Supreme Court policing of the districting process, but aided the Supreme Court's thinking about further entries into the political thicket, such as its later forays into policing of racial or partisan gerrymandering. 3 Nor would characterizing Justice Stewart's standard as one that would have promoted more result-oriented judging be fair." 4 Once the Court entered into this thicket, the choice was not one between judging based upon objective standards and result-oriented judging.
"precisely because of considerations of administrability"); Auerbach, supra note 76, at 61 ("Any effort to apply [Justice Stewart's] test practically calls for such a detailed evaluation of the politics of a state-which are always subject to change-that its application would hurl the Court back into the thicket of non-justiciable issues."). 83. In contrast to this position, Peter Schuck argues against a separation of rights and remedies, claiming in particular that judges should consider the scope of the remedy before finding the violation of any particular right. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 186-89 (1983).
84. Cf Overton, supra note 8, at 95 ("Standards allow judges to introduce arbitrary and subjective political biases into their deliberations and thus do not clearly confine the decisionmaking power of judges."). My point is simply that a bright-line rule like the oneperson, one-vote standard similarly allows judges to introduce subjective political biases into the rule, though it is done in one fell swoop.
A separate criticism of Stewart's rule, raised by Lowenstein, is that the standard would have threatened the pluralist system of districting by requiring that the content (that is, outcome) of a districting process be rational. Rather the choice was whether to have all the results dictated at the front end through the one-person, one-vote rule, or to allow for variation on the back-end through Justice Stewart's flexible standard. Arguably the latter is a more satisfactory solution, at least initially, and at least in situations like the apportionment cases where highly disputed normative principles are involved.
That is not to say that the Court should never have refined Justice Stewart's test into a more manageable standard, perhaps even eventual use of the one-person, one-vote standard. But the Court lost valuable information by moving decisively, rather than incrementally.
Of course, nothing now formally prevents the Court from backpedaling from a decisive standard like the one-person, one-vote standard. But my sense is that a move from a mushy unmanageable standard to a more manageable standard is easier for the Court than to overrule existing precedent or even to make a sub silentio switch from a firm manageable standard to mushiness. The point is illustrated by the criticism that the Court has faced in for its inconsistent willingness to allow slight deviations in district populations depending upon whether the districting is congressional or state/local.' Had this distinction developed incrementally out of an unmanageable standard, it would have likely faced greater acceptance.
In addition, the Court sometimes will not get valuable information about the effects of its decision when it adopts a manageable standard in the first instance, and therefore will not know about the need to backpedal. For example, the problems with regional government formation perhaps were not appreciated adequately at the time the Court decided Avery. With a Stewart-like standard applied on the local level, the Court could have observed whether state legislatures responded to regional government plans that failed to comply with one person, one vote. Perhaps the legislatures would have blocked such plans with great population disparities; or perhaps the legislatures would have approved of such plans, finding that the "federal" model was politically desirable on the regional level. Perhaps also the Court could have observed the success or failure of political pressure on the state government from those people in malapportioned regional government districts. This information would have proved valuable to the Court in considering the ultimate constitutionality of unequally apportioned regional government schemes.
85. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
II. CALIBRATING CONTROVERSY TO UNMANAGEABILITY: WEALTH QUALIFICATIONS, VOTER QUALIFICATIONS, AND VOTE-COUNTING STANDARDS
Unmanageability is not an unmitigated good in election law cases. As noted in the introduction, unmanageability imposes greater administrative costs, increased straying by the lower courts from Supreme Court majority preference, and a decreased ability of political actors to rely upon Supreme Court precedent.
These concerns are mitigated, however, when the Court calibrates the unmanageability of its standard to the novelty or controversy of its equal protection holding: the greater the novelty or controversy surrounding the holding, the more unmanageable the standard that the Court should articulate. To illustrate this approach using three cases of increasing novelty or controversy, consider Before proceeding with this analysis, I must detour with a significant caveat. In the introduction, I explained that when the Supreme Court considers intervening in an election law dispute under the Equal Protection Clause, it should undertake a two-part analysis. First, the Court should intervene only when the political process cannot correct itself from apparent political market failure. Second, if the Court intervenes, it should engage in the calibration that I am now describing. My detour looks at the first part of this testpolitical market failure-for the three cases at issue.
Harper looks like a case that passes the first test because voters frozen out of the political process cannot use the political process to get in. 89 Kramer is a more questionable case on this basis. Although voters excluded from the school district election could not effectively use the local political process to get relief, arguably the voters-who were fully enfranchised in state elections---could have used the state 86. 383 U.S. 663 (1966 9 Despite the fact that one and perhaps two of the three cases I choose in this part are cases in which the Court should not have intervened, I focus here on only the second part of the test. That is, assuming the Court was correct in intervening in these cases, was the level of manageability of the rule enunciated by the Court properly calibrated to the novelty of the equal protection holding? This second part of the test is especially important if, as in the case of Bush v. Gore, the Court will sometimes err in the first part of the analysis.
A. Little Novelty/Highly Manageable Standard
Harper fits into the category of cases in which the Court's equal protection holding had little novelty and therefore it was appropriate for the Court to articulate a highly manageable standard. In Harper, Virginia residents sought to have Virginia's poll tax, which required an annual payment of one dollar and fifty cents as a precondition to voting, declared unconstitutional. 92 The Court chose not to rely upon history indicating that the tax originally was devised to disenfranchise African Americans, 9 ' instead asking whether a fairly applied poll tax could violate the Equal Protection Clause. 94 The Court, in holding that a fairly applied poll tax violated equal protection, announced a bright-line manageable rule: "We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard." 95 The Court did not need to announce such a bright-line rule in striking down Virginia's poll tax. For example, the Court could have said something more opaque like: "Because the right to vote is so fundamental and because a poll tax will make it more likely that the poor people will fail to vote in Virginia elections, the state has the burden of proving convincingly that a substantial relationship exists between the poll tax and voter qualifications. The state has made no such showing here."
The Court was correct in articulating a highly manageable standard. The reason is not that the doctrinal case under the Equal Protection Clause for the rule was stronger than the doctrinal case for the one-person, one-vote rule in Reynolds. As Ely explained, despite the Harper Court calling the poll tax "irrational," "[i]t may also be true, or at least it is not irrational to think so, that persons of some wealth tend to be more 'responsible' citizens or, more plausibly still, that willingness to pay a fee for voting is some reflection of serious interest in the election." 97 Instead, the Court was correct in using the manageable standard because a near social consensus existed in the United States against the poll tax by the time the Court decided Harper.
The case for this social consensus was made, somewhat ironically, 98 by Justice Harlan in his Harper dissent. Justice Harlan explained that poll taxes in federal elections had already been banned by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which had passed very quickly 9 Most states had abolished poll taxes for state and local elections, leaving only four states (including Virginia) still using them. 1° After setting forth the old argument that the poll tax encourages the "right" kind of voters to vote, Justice Harlan explained that such "viewpoints, to be sure, ring hollow on most contemporary ears. Property and 96. Id. 97. ELY, supra note 2, at 120; see also Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct". The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, & THE SUPREME COURT 13, 15 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (characterizing Harper as a "free-form decision" that was "something of a stretch under classical equal protection law given that a poll tax is facially neutral and, unlike literacy tests, can be applied in a mechanical way that eliminates the dangers of political discretion").
98. Harlan raised the point to show that Congress or the constitutional amendment process could take care of the problem, and that it was not the Court's place to hold the poll tax unconstitutional.
99. Harper, 383 U.S. at 680,685 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 100. Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current egalitarian norms of how a modern democracy should be organized." 101 The Court's position was thus neither novel nor particularly controversial. Indeed, it was in line with an emerging view of political equality that excluded wealth considerations." a2 In such circumstances, the Court properly articulated a manageable standard eliminating all wealth qualifications for voting.
B. Intermediate Novelty/Less Manageable Standard
Kramer fits into the category of cases in which the Court's equal protection holding had somewhat greater novelty than Harper and therefore it was appropriate for the Court to articulate a somewhat less manageable standard. In Kramer, the plaintiff, an unmarried district resident who lived with his parents, brought a class action suit challenging a New York law limiting the franchise in his school district's election to owners and renters of taxable realty in the district, along with their spouses, and parents or guardians of children in public schools. The plaintiff did not challenge the age, citizenship, or residency requirements imposed by the district. 1 0 3
By the time the Court decided Kramer in 1969, it had understood its earlier cases such as Reynolds and Harper to require application of strict scrutiny to voting classifications because voting constituted a "fundamental right."' ' "° Strict scrutiny requires that the state provide a compelling state interest to justify its discrimination and that the means be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The Court held that the state failed to meet its burden under strict scrutiny and that the New York law therefore was unconstitutional. Of particular interest here is that the Court articulated a fairly unmanageable standard to apply in future cases.
The state argued that it had a legitimate interest in limiting the franchise in school district elections to those "primarily interested in such elections" and that the category of those persons allowed to vote [Vol. 80 were those primarily interested in school affairs. 1 0 5 The Court understood the argument as one limiting the franchise to those "directly affected" by school affairs, rather than those "subjectively concerned" about school matters." 6 As the Court wrote:
The State apparently reasons that since the schools are financed in part by local property taxes, persons whose outof-pocket expenses are 'directly' affected by property tax changes should be allowed to vote. Similarly, parents of children in school are thought to have a 'direct' stake in school affairs and are given a vote. 0 7
The Court declined to reach the question of whether the state's interest was compelling. 08 Instead, the Court held that the classification was not narrowly tailored to meet the interest. "The classifications [of the state law] permit inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest, in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions."' 19 The Court elaborated in a footnote:
For example, appellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested in and affected by school board decisions; however, he has no vote. On the other hand, an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state or federal taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can participate in the election." 0 As Briffault has noted, the Court in Kramer, as it had in Baker, engaged in a judicial sleight-of-hand."' It wrote that it understood the state's argument as one about an objective interest in elections, but its analysis switched to the plaintiff's subjective state of mind and the subjective state of mind the fictional unemployed counterpart in holding the provision was not narrowly tailored. [T]he Court's use of the term "interest," and its contrast between [plaintiff] and his fictional unemployed counterpart, suggests that the relevant interests were subjective states of mind, rather than objective ties to school board operations. Kramer was attentive to and concerned about local school affairs. He was, therefore, "interested." His fictional unemployed counterpart was indifferent when the subject of education came up and therefore, not Thus, the Court enunciated a fuzzy rule when it could have enunciated a manageable standard. The Court failed to define what "constitutes an 'interest' sufficient to justify a claim to the franchise ' 113 in the school district election. The Court could have simply and clearly held that the franchise may not be limited except on the basis of age, citizenship, and residency. That would be an exceedingly manageable rule to apply in future cases.
Perhaps the Court did not so hold because to do so would have contradicted directly the Court's earlier decision in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections."' In Lassiter, the Court upheld a fairly applied literacy test on grounds that the "ability to read and write.., has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot."' 15 A rule that limits voter qualifications to age, citizenship, and residency has no room for literacy tests. Despite the fact that Justice Black focused his Kramer dissent on his inability to distinguish the case from Lassiter," 6 the Kramer majority did not even cite Lassiter.
In retrospect, the Court's articulation of a less manageable standard may have been wise.
As Briffault argues, the disenfranchisement in Kramer was not especially troubling-it did not disenfranchise traditionally victimized groups, no entrenchment of a territorial minority existed, and no class discrimination existed. 11 7 Thus, the extension of equal protection law in this direction was somewhat novel. Moreover, unlike the situation in Harper, there was no evidence of a societal consensus that voting qualifications like the ones in Kramer or Lassiter were improper. The Court faced a situation where the equal protection issue was more novel, and thus the Court was correct to be less than crystal clear on the rule to apply in future cases.
The fuzziness of the Kramer standard gave room for the Court to further refine franchise standards. It carved out an exception for I "interested." Thus, the state statute had failed to discriminate with sufficient precision when it sought to vest the school board's franchise only in those "interested. special purpose districts in which the franchise could indeed be limited to classes of persons disproportionately impacted by the district's decisions. Indeed, in such elections, votes could be allocated other than on a one-person, one-vote basis. 18 What emerged from Kramer and the cases involving special election districts is a more nuanced set of rules that prohibits additional voter qualifications in most elections but allows such qualifications in a special class of elections. That regime would have been much harder to create if the Kramer Court had simply said "no additional voter qualifications in any elections." Still, the difficulty of satisfying the exception for special purpose district elections suggests that the Court should have created an even murkier standard in Kramer.
C. High Novelty/Unmanageable Standard
Bush v. Gore fits into the category of cases in which the Court's equal protection holding had great novelty and therefore the Court properly articulated an unmanageable standard. 1 9 Much ink has been spilled and continues to be spilled on this case, 20 and I do not intend to rehash the many legal issues here; instead I focus narrowly on the case's unmanageable equal protection standard.
Republican candidate George W. Bush challenged on equal protection grounds the standards for a statewide recount of the votes that the Florida Supreme Court had articulated in Democratic candidate Al Gore's election contest. The Bush v. Gore per curiam opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court began its equal protection analysis with the following words:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. After noting that "[t]he question before us... is whether the recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate,"'" the Court answered the question in the negative. It held that the recount mechanism adopted by the Florida Supreme Court did "not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right"" under the Equal Protection Clause for four related reasons: (1) although the Florida court had instructed that those individuals conducting the manual recounts judge ballots by discerning the "intent of the voter," it failed to formulate uniform rules to determine such intent, such as whether to count as a valid vote a ballot whose chad is hanging by two comers; (2) the recounts already undertaken included a manual recount of all votes in selected counties, including both undervotes and overvotes, but the new recounts ordered by the Florida court included only undervotes; (3) the Florida Supreme Court had ordered that the current vote totals include results of a partial recount from Miami-Dade County, allowing the Supreme Court to conclude that " [t] he Florida Supreme Court's decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts included in a final certification must be complete;" and (4) the Florida Supreme Court did not specify who would count the ballots, forcing county boards to include team members without experience in recounting ballots. Nor were observers permitted to object during the recount. 24 After holding the Florida procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court refused to remand the case to the Florida courts to articulate standards that would comply with the clause. By including language in the opinion limiting its precedential value to the "present circumstances,"'2 perhaps the case means nothing for the future development of equal protection law. On the other hand, by including vastly broad language indicating that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to "value one person's vote over that of another,"' 129 the opinion has potentially broad implications. Indeed, in another article I explore how the equal protection holding in Bush v. Gore might-and I emphasize might-apply to a host of other "nuts and bolts" election questions. 30 The opacity of the equal protection holding is actually the best feature of a very bad opinion. Overton noted, "the Court ... left lower courts and others without manageable tools to determine equal protection violations in the political context""'31-precisely, and all for the good. Now, as myriad cases make their way through the federal courts raising a Bush v. Gore equal protection claim (for example, is punch-card voting, with its relatively high error rate, now unconstitutional?), the courts will try different approaches to deal with the claims. Bush v. Gore will be viewed by lower court lenses in Rashomonic fashion and the Court will eventually sort it out. If the Court does its job well, it can refine its new equal protection standard in light of what works and does not work in the lower courts. 32 The Court was right to articulate an unmanageable standard because its holding was unprecedented and not in line with any social consensus about the proper standards to use in the recounting of ballots, an issue about which the public had no opinion before the 2000 controversy. As noted above, the Bush v. Gore Court's principal authority for its holding was Reynolds and Harper. 13 3 Neither case involved the mechanics of elections, what had heretofore been seen to be a matter for local officials. Indeed, the Court in recent years had expressed great deference to local officials who wished to structure their elections in the way they see fit."
The ' 6 Once the Court opened the door to claims of inequality in a system that granted everyone a vote, it opened the door as well to claims that the Constitution demanded greater proportionality in the voting systems used. This fear of proportional representation goes all the way back to Reynolds, where Justice Stewart in dissent in the companion Lucas case warned that the majority's position would lead to proportional representation. 37 The fear that political equality arguments, pushed to the extreme, might lead to court-imposed proportional representation is not laughable." 8 Assuming the Justices have this fear," 9 the question becomes what strategy the Court should use to block this development. The Court appears to have used two strategies: refusing to extend its political equality precedents to new types of claims and using unmanageable standards as a bulwark against extreme cases of political inequality.
Mobile v. Bolden 14 1 is an example of the Court using the first strategy. In Mobile, African-American residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the city's at-large method of electing its three city commissioners under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Fifteenth Amendment. The evidence showed that AfricanAmerican voters made up about one-third of the Mobile electorate, but given the persistence of substantial voting along racial lines and the use of at-large voting rather than single-member districts, no African-American-preferred candidate had ever been elected commissioner or was likely to be elected commissioner in the foreseeable future. ' Had voting taken place using single-member, rather than at-large districts, African-American voters would have had a better chance to elect a candidate of their choice, or at least to exert greater political influence. 42 The Court rejected the argument that the at-large method violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 4 1 A four-Justice plurality stated that plaintiffs' claim failed because the plaintiffs lacked evidence that the electoral system was designed with a racially discriminatory purpose. 144 Justice Blackmun concurred in the result on grounds that the relief afforded by the trial court "was not commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial discretion.' 1 4 5 Justice Stevens concurred essentially on grounds that a contrary ruling would be impossible to administer. 46 Three Justices dissented. 147 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, relied explicitly on Reynolds v. Sims" in arguing that the at-large system constituted a denial of equal protection:
Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny focused solely on the discriminatory effects of malapportionment. They recognize that, when population figures for the representational districts of a legislature are not similar, the votes of citizens in larger districts do not carry as much weight in the legislature as do votes cast by citizens in smaller districts. The equal protection problem attacked by the "one person, one vote" principle is, then, one of vote dilution: under Reynolds, each citizen must have an "equally effective voice" in the election of representatives. In the present cases, the alleged vote dilution, though caused by the combined effects of the electoral structure and social and historical factors rather than by unequal population distribution, is analytically the same concept: the unjustified abridgment of a fundamental right. It follows, then, that a showing of discriminatory intent is just as unnecessary under the vote-dilution approach.., as it is under our reapportionment cases. 149 The plurality rejected Justice Marshall's reliance on Reynolds. It saw his dissent as an endorsement of proportional representation and "not the law. The Equal Protection Clause... does not require proportional representation as an imperative of political organization.' 150 Regardless of whether Justice Marshall's position should properly be characterized as an endorsement of proportional representation, it seems no more a stretch to extend the equal protection analysis of Reynolds to the means of aggregating votes, what Marshall refers to as "electoral structures," than to the mechanics of voting. In other words, the principle of promoting political equality has no "natural" stopping point, even if we can draw distinctions among the cases.
Thus, a plurality of Justices wished to stop the equality precedents from going so far as proportional representation, while two other Justices saw Justice Marshall's test as an unmanageable 148 . Mobile, 446 U.S. at 116-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
one. In retrospect, the plurality's fears appear unfounded. Congress essentially codified Justice Marshall's position in Mobile v. Bolden through an amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982.152 Although section 2 has moved "electoral structures" toward greater proportionality, it does not appear to have created any general right to proportional representation. The Court has been careful not to interpret section 2 so broadly. 53 If indeed it was primarily fear of proportional representation, rather than some concern on the merits, that led the Mobile v. Bolden plurality away from a holding in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court should have considered instead imposing an unmanageable standard to see if lower courts could develop satisfactory ways to adjudicate these claims. The Court appears to have (perhaps unwittingly) adopted this type of approach in another election case from the 1980s, Davis v. Bandemer.'1 Bandemer involved the question of whether a political party could raise a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. A majority of the Court concluded that the Indiana Democrats' claim that the 1981 redistricting plan violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause was justiciable.' 55 Then, speaking for a plurality of the Court, Justice White articulated an unmanageable standard for judging when an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander has occurred.
The plurality's analysis began by stating that to make such a claim, proving both "intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group" is necessary. The plurality summarily upheld the district court's finding of discriminatory intent, noting that one party controlling the districting process often will have the intent of discriminating against the other party.
6
The big question in Bandemer was how a political party could prove "actual discriminatory effect." The plurality's analysis on this point began by recognizing that there is no constitutional right to proportional representation 157 and that "mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional 152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988 discrimination."' 158 "Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."' 159 Applying this test, the Court concluded that the Indiana Democrats failed to prove discriminatory effect.
Commentators have disagreed on the meaning of Bandemer since it was decided. Professor Bernard Groflnan, for example, construed the case to mean that partisan gerrymandering is unlawful when it is "(1) intentional, (2) severe, and (3) predictably nontransient in its effects."'" Professor Dan Lowenstein, in contrast, believes that the Court imposed an extremely high bar for proving partisan gerrymandering, but did so in a way to "retain the option to intervene." He suggests that perhaps members of the plurality did so because they "recogniz[ed] the complexity of the subject, [ These historical developments belie the strongly voiced concerns at the time of Bandemer that the case likely would lead to a constitutional right to proportional representation.
Justice O'Connor, in her Bandemer concurrence, stated that the plurality's "standard will over time either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or else evolve toward some loose form of proportionality."' 65 Professor Peter Schuck developed these arguments further, purporting to demonstrate that "Bandemer, despite the Court's disclaimer, Will encourage proportionality as the standard against which partisan gerrymandering claims will tend to be measured."' 66 For good or not, Bandemer's unmanageability has served as a bulwark against proportional representation. Had lower courts more aggressively interpreted Bandemer to create such a right, the Supreme Court was ready to reinterpret its standard in Bandemer to reverse the trend. In the meantime, as Lowenstein suggests, Bandemer serves as a backstop (and perhaps as a deterrent) to police the most egregious forms of partisan gerrymandering. The unmanageability solution, rather than the path taken in Mobile v. Bolden, provides the Court with the greatest flexibility as it ponders these political questions about which it sometimes has little more to go on than intuition.
CONCLUSION
Unmanageability in the pursuit of political equality is no vice. Indeed, unmanageable judicial standards have much to commend them in certain circumstances. If we think about the overused metaphor of the Court making its way through the political thicket, we might imagine a few ways that the Court could reach its destination. We begin with the Court stuck in a deep forest. Manageable standards are the equivalent of the leader using all of her resources to clear the path in a particular direction. That strategy is appropriate if one has a very good sense of where one wants to go, but dangerous if one does not.
When unsure of the correct direction, the leader's best strategy might be to stay in a single location and send a few scouts out along different paths. Each scout then reports to the leader with updated information on the paths available. The leader, after receiving this information, can then make a more informed decision on the ultimate path to be taken. If the Court, as is likely, will remain in the political thicket, unmanageability may be one of the best tools available for finding the right paths. 
